Haryana Elections 2024 surprise: How did the BJP win

Haryana's political battle has concluded, with the BJP securing its third consecutive term, surpassing its previous records. Following its victory in Madhya Pradesh, where it retained power with a solid majority, the BJP defied analysts' predictions once again. Unlike Madhya Pradesh's popular Shivraj Singh Chouhan, Haryana's Chief Minister was changed just six months prior, following Manohar Lal Khattar's exit, which left a wave of anti-incumbency. Pre-election reports highlighted the "Congress Ki Hawa Chal Rahi Hai" sentiment and exit polls favoured Congress with Deepender Singh Hooda as the next CM. However, the Congress's reliance on Jat voters, its overt backing of Hooda and poor management alienated non-Jat communities, leading to its defeat in Haryana Elections 2024. In contrast, the BJP adapted, learning from past mistakes and benefiting from RSS support, which bridged caste divides. Yogi Adityanath's rhetoric, such as "Batenge Toh Katenge," resonated with nationalist voters. Additionally, community events, caste-focused promises, and strong booth-level strategies significantly boosted the BJP's campaign.

The BJP's seat tally this year rose from 40 in 2019 to 48. The Congress also improved its seat count, surpassing other parties like the Indian National Lok Dal (INLD) and the Jannayak Janta Party (JJP). The INLD, which had won 19 seats in 2014, managed to secure only two this year. Similarly, the JJP, which held 10 seats in 2019, failed to win any seats this time around. The Haryana political landscape has offered numerous lessons in strategic maneuvering. The question now is whether similar dynamics will play out in Maharashtra, where tensions between the dominant Maratha community and the OBCs are escalating. Can the BJP's precise strategy, which succeeded in Haryana, replicate its impact in Maharashtra and Jharkhand? As time unfolds, the answer will emerge. Meanwhile, it's crucial to examine the recent election outcomes and the tactical moves employed by both the BJP and Congress to better understand their approaches.

Also Read: Maharashtra's war of narratives: Caste Balances and Development

Haryana's electoral history reveals dynamic shifts, often driven by anti-incumbency and strategic political alliances. The Congress dominated the state in 2004 and managed to retain power in 2009 despite the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) allying with the Indian National Lok Dal (INLD). Notably, since Haryana's formation in 1966, incumbent governments were typically voted out, with exceptions in 2009 and 2019. The BJP's performance improved between the 2014 and 2019 elections, increasing from 7 to 10 seats, bucking the usual trend of anti-incumbency.

Haryana's politics is marked by high electoral volatility. The state's economic development, driven by a robust agricultural and industrial base, has resulted in a population with relatively high expectations, often unswayed by simple promises of incentives or subsidies. This has led voters to frequently seek leadership changes, viewing regime shifts as pathways to further progress.

Political alliances in Haryana are often fluid, contributing to the state's unpredictable election outcomes. An example is the 2004 Lok Sabha elections when the BJP anticipated an anti-incumbency wave against INLD leader Abhay Singh Chautala and severed their alliance, impacting the electoral results. Similarly, in 2024, voters responded to BJP's dominance and its ambitious "400+ seats" campaign by voting against the party, causing a power shift.

While the Congress and BJP remain the two major political forces, influential political families like the Hoodas of Rohtak, Chautalas of Sirsa, and others like the Bansi Lal and Bhajan Lal families have historically shaped Haryana's politics. Their ability to channel Jat votes and leverage caste dynamics has often swayed elections. However, in 2024, a noticeable decline in the influence of these families hinted at changing political dynamics in the state, reflecting a departure from the traditional power structures.

The Indian National Lok Dal (INLD) in Haryana represents the influence of dominant peasant castes like the Jats (25-30% of the population) and Ahirs (OBC). Founded by Chaudhary Devi Lal, known as the "Tau" of Haryana, the party has deep roots in regional politics. Before Haryana's formation in 1966, regional parties like the Unionist Party (Sir Chhotu Ram) and Haryana Lok Samiti (Shri Sher Singh) existed but often merged with Congress. Post-1966, factionalism within Congress spurred the rise of regional parties, including the Vishal Haryana Party (VHP).

Ticket Distribution Strategy Of The BJP And The Congress

The Jats have traditionally been considered Congress supporters, with 53% of Jats voting for the Congress party, while 28% sided with the BJP. Surprisingly, the alliance between INLD and Mayawati managed to secure only 6% of the Jat vote, which is notably low for a party associated with the Chautala family. Even their core support base, the Jats, largely shifted away from the 'mother party.'

The Congress party then aimed to attract votes from the Dalit and Scheduled Castes (SC), with Kumari Selja, a prominent Congress leader, actively engaging with these communities. It was believed that this strategy could replicate their success in the Lok Sabha elections, where 50% of Jatav voters supported Congress. However, 35% of Jatavs shifted to the BJP. Among non-Jatav Dalits, the BJP made significant inroads, further affecting Congress's prospects.

Muslims, along with Jats and Jatavs, formed a crucial part of the Congress's voter base, but their numbers were not sufficient to translate into a significant number of seats, except in the Nuh area. The Congress won all three seats in this region. On the other hand, the BJP received substantial support from non-Jat groups like Brahmins, Punjabis, and Khatris - communities from which Chief Minister Manohar Lal Khattar hails. The BJP garnered 62% of votes from these groups, which contributed to its strong performance in the Ahirwal belt and South Haryana.

In the SC community, a significant shift occurred after the SC/ST sub-classification verdict, which emphasised "quota within quota" for different SC groups. While the BJP did not openly endorse this decision at the national level, they quietly promoted its benefits within Haryana. This move resonated with the non-Jatav SCs, of whom 45% supported the BJP. As a result, the division of SC votes favored the BJP.

The BJP's strategy and policies helped them secure 17 out of 23 seats in regions like the Nuh belt, Gurgaon, Rewari, Mahendragarh, Palwal, and Faridabad, which are adjacent to UP and Rajasthan. The BJP also fielded seven Yadav candidates, of whom six won, leading to a near-clean sweep in South Haryana.

Meanwhile, the Congress's attempts to appeal to the Punjabi community with promises of a refugee settlement board and other benefits fell short. Despite these efforts, 68% of the Punjabi Khatri community supported the BJP. The Congress, though it won more seats than the BJP, did so with narrow margins - one seat by just 32 votes, and three others by less than 1,000 votes.

Overall, while the electorate in Haryana witnessed polarisation with voters decisively choosing between the BJP and Congress, the BJP's strategic moves among diverse communities gave it the edge. The emergence of the INLD and JJP alliance, which sought to combine Jat and SC votes, did not manage to sway the voters significantly. As a result, Haryana's political scene remained dominated by the two main rivals, with the BJP ultimately gaining an advantage.

Before the elections, many observers closely followed the Haryana elections, noting that 26 rebels were contesting from one place and 25 from another. It was said that independent candidates, who were either party rebels or running independently, disrupted the results in many seats. Despite this, only three independents managed to win, while the share of votes for other independents in Haryana was around eight and a half percent. However, on 15 seats, independent or rebel candidates created a triangular contest, and in 10 of these, the Congress party suffered a loss. Overall, the Congress ended up winning 11 fewer seats than the BJP.

It became evident that the BJP had put significant effort into convincing voters to join their side, whereas the Congress believed their core voters would remain loyal without needing much effort. This assumption proved costly for the Congress, as the BJP, the INLD-BSP alliance, and especially the rebels made things difficult for them. At one point, the Congress was confident about their popularity, boasting about receiving 2500 to 3000 applications for just 90 tickets. However, this created tension within the party, as many feared that the rebels might disrupt their chances.

A specific example was in Ambala Cantt, where Parvinder Pari contested as the Congress candidate, while Chitra Sarwara ran as an independent against him. Sarwara came in second, and if she hadn't run, Anil Vij might have lost the election. Alternatively, if Sarwara had been given the Congress ticket, combining her votes with the Congress might have led to Vij's defeat. Such situations occurred in several seats, leading to internal criticism within the Congress. It was rumoured that Hooda strategically placed certain candidates, while some were allegedly forced to run against the party's interests.

On the other hand, the BJP crafted a narrative that emphasised the fear of Jat dominance, suggesting that if Hooda's rule returned, Jatism and caste-based dominance would follow. Rather than focusing on their developmental work, they capitalized on these fears to secure votes, steering the narrative away from their track record. This strategy played a key role in their electoral performance.

During the elections, it was noted that the dominance of the Hooda family, particularly father and son, led to dissatisfaction among the silent voters, who expressed their discontent decisively. According to the Election Commission, the results showed that the BJP secured 48 seats, while Congress got 37 seats. Among them, 10 Congress rebels won with a margin higher than the BJP's victory margin, effectively taking 10 seats away from Congress and indirectly benefiting the BJP. If not for these rebels, Congress might have been in a position to change the outcome.

Notably, Congress won in Mewat and a few other areas with a significant number of votes, bringing the vote share of both parties close to 40%. The difference between the two was about 9 votes per 100,000. If Congress had gained just a few more seats, they might have been in a position to form the government.

The narrative around the Jat and non-Jat issue didn't seem to have a significant impact on the elections, as no strong statements on the matter came from any leaders during the campaign. However, a comment directed at Kumari Selja did go viral, which created anxiety among certain communities about their prospects under a Congress government. This unease was palpable during ground visits, but the Congress leadership struggled to address it effectively, even as Rahul Gandhi emphasized unity among the state's diverse communities during his Vijay Sankalp Yatra.

Rahul Gandhi's efforts to appeal to all 36 communities did not fully resonate with the electorate, and the damage from the viral comment lingered. Some analysts suggest that Congress could have won as few as 27 seats if not for Rahul's outreach efforts. Despite his team of advisors, they were unable to gauge the dissatisfaction or manage Hooda's influence effectively.

Regarding the Dalit vote, Congress won nine out of 17 Dalit seats, an increase from the seven it won last time, while the BJP took the remaining eight. Some believe that if Kumari Selja's concerns had been addressed sooner, Congress might have won even more seats. Yet, the perception that Congress sidelined her persisted, leading to frustration and later, her public statements. The high command's response came late, with Mallikarjun Kharge meeting her only after her frustration became public.

Meanwhile, the BJP's focus on OBC voters and efforts by the RSS helped it gain traction. The party capitalized on the perception that it had provided benefits like jobs without bribery and improved conditions for farmers. This was contrasted with Congress's promises, and the BJP's approach seemed more convincing to voters. Additionally, BJP's efforts to engage non-Jat voters, as seen in Uttar Pradesh, played a role in its strategy in Haryana, helping the party secure support across different communities.

The Congress faced a complex situation where Jats and SC voters, who were expected to lean towards them, did not support the party en masse. Similarly, in Mewat, where the BJP faced opposition due to earlier violence, the lack of alternatives meant that Congress's gains remained limited. The BJP's messaging, especially around its governance and social equity, resonated more with voters, solidifying its position in the state.

Where did the Congress go wrong

1. The INC could not handle the tussle between Kumari Selja and Deepinder Singh Hooda

• Kumari Selja, a senior Congress leader, has been vocal about her displeasure with the party's ticket distribution for the upcoming Haryana elections. Staying at her Delhi residence for days, she has chosen to skip Congress President Mallikarjun Kharge's event in Anvala. The root of her frustration lies in what she perceives as an unfair ticket allocation process. Despite her influence, only ten tickets were allotted to her camp, including four sitting MLAs, which she considered insufficient.
• Selja's supporters have been disheartened by their limited share, especially as candidates close to rival leaders were favored. For instance, she opposed giving tickets to the relatives of politicians, but the party still nominated Pooja Chaudhary, wife of Ambala MP Varun Chaudhary, and Vikas Saharan, son of MP Jayaprakash JP. Her ally, Dr. Ajay Chaudhary, was denied a ticket in Narnaund, further adding to her grievances. Additionally, she was against Jarnail Singh's renomination in Ratia and former minister Nirmal Singh's candidacy in Ambala City. Despite her opposition, these decisions went through, fueling her discontent.

2. The INC had no organisation on the ground

"Sangathan" (organisation) is the buzzword for the last 2-3 years. The BJP always boasts of its ground organization and workers in the form of various cells, Morchas, Aghadis, unions, etc. It is surprising to note that for 1.5 years, the Congress Haryana Unit had not appointed the district presidents. It is also speculated that even district-level election committees weren't formed to collect the candidate names from the party office bearers at the district level.

3. The Haryana Congress President Uday Bhan himself contested election

Uday Bhan, the Haryana Congress President, faced criticism for his decision to contest elections directly, which some within the party viewed as a misstep that contributed to the Congress's defeat. As a party leader, Bhan's focus on his campaign may have diverted attention from broader campaign strategies across the state, leading to weaker support for other Congress candidates. Additionally, internal party dynamics, such as disagreements over candidate selection and dissatisfaction among key leaders like Kumari Selja, further undermined the party's cohesion during the elections. These factors combined made it difficult for Congress to present a united front, which ultimately impacted its performance in the polls.

4. The Haryana Congress in-charge Deepak Babaria was ill

Deepak Babaria's illness significantly impacted the Congress party's performance in the recent Haryana elections. As the AICC in-charge for Haryana, Babaria's health issues limited his active participation during crucial campaign periods. His absence affected the coordination and strategic planning needed for the Congress to capitalize on the anti-incumbency sentiment against the BJP.

5. Over-dependence on Jat, Muslim and Dalit vote bank

Right from the entry of the Hooda Father-Son duo along with Vinesh Phogat, the party's focus was on the Jat vote bank politics. For the rest of the communities, the INC considered every vote bank as the anti-incumbency vote bank. The poll strategists as well as the office bearers of the party considered that even the OBCs and other upper castes will vote against the BJP.

6. The internal rebels

• If we look at the data related to the election results, there have been 15 seats where independent candidates have secured more votes than the margin of defeat. Out of these, BJP has won 12 seats while Congress has remained in second place. Congress has won two seats and the INLD candidate has defeated Congress on 1 seat.
• Out of these 12 seats, 3 were such where the rebel candidates of Congress came in third place. Apart from this, on 4 more seats where Congress lost, the rebel candidates either won or came in second place. This simply means that on 7 seats Congress had to face defeat due to its rebels being in the fray, while on 9 other seats, independents worsened the situation so much that Congress lost and BJP won.

7. The Parchi - Kharchi Campaign

The first and most impactful campaign of the BJP in Haryana was "Bina Parchi, Bina Kharchi" with simultaneously alleging the Congress for giving jobs through corruption during their tenure in the state. Congress MLA Neeraj Sharma's statement saying that Congress will give one job per 50 votes sparked the row. He further said that he doesn't understand the merit and that the village that gave the most votes will get the maximum votes. There were even multiple interview clips of voters saying that they got jobs or their relatives got jobs under the BJP government without any corruption. The Congress party did not even address this issue and never said that their party would give employment based on merit.

The OBC strategy of the BJP

The BJP initially concentrated on gaining support from non-Jat OBC communities, including Yadav, Gurjar, Saini, Pal, Nai, Kumhar, Khati, and Kashyap, as well as the Brahmin, Bania, and Punjabi communities. Shortly after Pradhan assumed responsibility for Haryana, the Saini-led state government increased reservations for backward classes in Group-A and Group-B government jobs from 15% to 27%. Additionally, Saini raised the OBC creamy layer ceiling from Rs six lakh to Rs eight lakh just before the assembly elections.

Dharmendra Pradhan (Haryana Election In-Charge of BJP) established his base in Panchkula, Kurukshetra, and Rohtak, where he held meetings with various OBC groups, including Pal, Kashyap, and Kamboj, as well as Scheduled Castes like Ravidas, Jogi, and Bajigar to address their concerns. He, along with the party's co-incharge Surendra Nagar, maintained close interactions with booth workers at the grassroots level and held closed-door meetings in several areas, especially those dominated by Gujjars.

The BJP believed that this strategy would help it gain influence in regions such as Yamunanagar, Ambala, Panchkula, Kurukshetra, Panipat, and Karnal. The party also had high hopes for the Ahirwal areas, including Rewari, Gurugram, Mahendragarh, and Bhiwani. In Faridabad, where many Gujjars and migrants from other states lived, the BJP anticipated a competitive advantage.

However, following events like the Agneepath scheme, the farmers' movement, and the wrestlers' movement, a significant part of the Jat community mobilized against the BJP. The Jats felt that voting for the INLD and JJP would divide their votes, so they decided to support the Congress to strengthen the opposition against the BJP.

As the ticket distribution led to internal disputes, senior BJP leaders, including former Chief Minister Manohar Lal Khattar and Saini, reached out to the rebels to resolve the tensions. Saini even visited the residence of party veteran Ram Bilas Sharma in Mahendragarh to appease him after he was denied a ticket. Meanwhile, Khattar engaged with urban centers where there was a considerable Punjabi population.

In a significant victory, the BJP won the Uchana Kalan assembly seat for the first time since independence, emphasizing its focus on non-Jat candidates even in Jat-dominated areas. This high-profile contest was between the Chautala clan and the family of Birendra Singh, the grandson of Sir Chhotu Ram. In the end, the BJP's Brahmin candidate triumphed, marking a notable achievement for the party.

Raja Rao Indrajit Singh is also a big factor

Rao Indrajit Singh is the king of the Yadav-dominated region in of Ahirwal, Haryana. Rao Indrajit Singh belongs to the royal family of the Yadav community. It is believed that the entire Yadav community of Haryana is united behind Rao Indrajit Singh. Rao Indrajit Singh is counted among the top leaders of the BJP. Rao Indrajit Singh was earlier in the Congress. But in 2014, he joined the BJP.

Rao Indrajit Singh's father has also been the Chief Minister of Haryana for some time. In such a situation, the Yadav community hopes that the BJP will make Rao Indrajit Singh the Chief Minister one day. On the other hand, the Ahir i.e. Yadav community of Haryana is economically prosperous and is the ruling class, so it wants to keep itself away from the SP-RJD definition of social justice.

The magic Of RSS

The unexpected loss during the Lok Sabha 2024 elections left every BJP supporter in shock. While over-confidence and dependence on other party imports were considered to be a major reason behind the fall in seats of the BJP, the rift between the BJP and the RSS was also pointed out by many. If there is something that the Congress cannot match the BJP, it's the huge support of the RSS. In the last 4 months, the RSS started with "Matdata Jagrukta Abhiyan" covering 6,000 villages in Haryana and conducting 16,000 sabhas. It is also reported that the RSS conducted their survey across all the assembly constituencies and their candidate preference was later conveyed to the party. Thus, the micro-management of the RSS and the BJP was the magic behind the numbers that we see today in the state.

Ritwik Mehta is the founder of Niti Tantra and a political strategist.

The views expressed here are the individual's and don't represent those of the paper.